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Recent Developments in Securing
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Firms
and Individuals
DENNIS 0. LYNCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
This morning I would like to discuss the process for obtaining
jurisdiction over nonresidents, with particular emphasis on foreign
firms and foreign individuals. The primary focus will be on recent
developments in the law of jurisdiction. These developments do not
necessarily involve either foreign corporations or foreign individuals,
but they have important implications for obtaining jurisdiction over
foreign companies. The most important recent case is Shaffer v.
Heitner;J in examining its implications, I will draw on a series of
recent cases involving foreign companies.
Prior to discussing the Supreme Court's opinion in Shaffer, I
would like to describe briefly the framework courts have used to de-
termine jurisdictional issues during the past hundred years. This will
provide a basis for discussing Shaffer and for understanding the way
the case alters the prior doctrine.
There will also be a few references to recent Florida decisions
interpreting the state's long-arm statutes and to the way Florida law
may be influenced by the Supreme Court's opinion in Shaffer.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF PENNOYER v- NEFF
A. The Power Theory
The structure of the law of jurisdiction in the United States was
basically established by Pennoyer v. Neff in 1877,2 and implicitly
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law; B.A., 1965, Oregon; J.D., 1969,
Harvard; LL. M., 1973, Yale; Law and Modernization Resident Fellow, Yale, 1972-74;
Program Advisor in Law and Urban Affairs, Ford Foundation, Bogota, Colombia,
1969-72.
1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). For scholarly comment on Shaffer see Lowenfeld, In
Search of the Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 102
(1978); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 33
(1978); Note, Measuring the Long Arm After Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv.
126 (1978); Note, If the (International) Shoe Fits-Subsequent Interpretation of
Shaffer v. Heitner, 10 RUT.-CAM. 175 (1978); 1978 WIS. L. REV. 533.
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
overruled by the Supreme Court one hundred years later in a foot-
note in Shaffer.3 The conceptual framework Justice Field set forth in
Pennoyer has been referred to as both the power theory of jurisdic-
tion and as the concept of territoriality. 4 Justice Field created three
different categories of jurisdiction. The first category, in personam
jurisdiction, enables a plaintiff to obtain a judgment which can be
satisfied out of defendant's general assets. In ren jurisdiction, the
second category, is somewhat distinct. This form of jurisdiction limits
the court's power to the adjudication of rights over property which is
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The third category,
quasi in rein jurisdiction, has created the most confusion; it is the
subject of the Supreme Court's opinion in Shaffer.
In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court established two types of quasi
in rein jurisdiction: Type A and Type B, for purposes of this discus-
sion. In Type A, the court is not adjudicating the rights of everyone
to specific property, but rather the rights of particular individuals.
One example is a mortgage foreclosure, where a plaintiff is exercising
his right under a mortgage contract to adjudicate plaintiff's and de-
fendant's interest in real property. Other examples include the parti-
tioning of land, liens, rights in a trust, or rights based on claims
somewhat independent of, but related to, particular property.
The second type of quasi in rem jurisdiction, Type B, is based on
a distinct concept which has been the source of the confusion. In
Type B, the cause of action bears no relationship to the attached
property. For example, Able sues Doe on a contract. Doe has no
contacts with the jurisdiction in which Able files the action, except for
a bank account. The contract was entered into elsewhere, and the
cause of action arose elsewhere; consequently, the court does not
have in personain jurisdiction over Doe. Nevertheless, under Type B
jurisdiction, Able can garnish the bank account and sue Doe on the
unrelated contract claim up to the value of the garnished property.
It is the capacity of a court to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant through the Type B procedure which the Shaffer
opinion appears to overrule. I say "appears to overrule" because the
concept of power over property within a jurisdiction and over the
owner up to the value of that property is deeply embedded in the law
of jurisdiction, and the concept may persist, even though the
3. 433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
4. See Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT.
REV. 241.
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Supreme Court says that it no longer exists. In fact, there may be
good justification for the continued use of Type B jurisdiction in a
limited number of situations, particularly when one is dealing with
foreign companies.
When I speak of "territoriality," I mean the assumption underly-
ing the Pennoyer opinion that a state or a sovereign had no power to
go beyond its territorial boundaries. This was at the heart of Justice
Field's opinion. The concept assumes that the courts of a sovereign
can only obtain service of process and jurisdiction over individuals or
corporations physically located within the sovereign's territorial
boundaries .
The expansion of commerce and interstate travel caused the idea
of territorial limitations on jurisdiction to break down quickly. The
first changes came through the use of such "legal fictions" as an
automobile driver's "implied consent" to be served with process in
automobile accident cases where the defendant was an out-of-state
driver. If a person drives into State X and uses State X's highways,
state legislation instructs the court to assume the driver has con-
sented to be sued in State X by anyone he has harmed while driving
on the highway, although he never gave actual consent.
6
Eventually the Supreme Court cut through such legal fictions in
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,7 and formulated a
new test for determining a state's power to exercise in personam
jurisdiction. In International Shoe, a cause of action was brought
against a corporation to recover payments due an unemployment
compensation fund. The company had no actual business outlet in the
State of Washington, but it did have employees in the state who so-
licited orders to be transmitted to the company's main office in a sec-
ond state.
The Court dispensed with the question of whether the corpora-
tion was "present" in a territorial sense in the State of Washington.
Instead, the Supreme Court said the central question was whether it
was fair, given the extent of the corporation's contacts with
Washington, to force the corporation to litigate the State's claims in a
Washington state court. 8 What has developed from International
Shoe is a "minimum contacts" test as a way of asking whether it is
5. 95 U.S. at 727.
6. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
7. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8. Id. at 320.
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fair, under our system of federalism and the due process clause, to
require a particular defendant to litigate a cause of action in a specific
state.
The concepts of in rein and quasi in rein jurisdiction continued
parallel to this "minimum contacts" framework even though the as-
sumptions underlying the theories were contradictory. The height of
the power theory of jurisdiction was Harris v. Balk,9 a case that has
baffled law students for years. Harris owed Balk $180; both were res-
idents of North Carolina. Harris went to Maryland where Epstein
lived. Epstein claimed Balk owed him $344. When Harris came to
Baltimore, Epstein, in order to collect Balk's debt, garnished the
debt from Harris to Balk. The court never asked whether Balk had
any relationship with the State of Maryland or whether it was fair to
force Balk to litigate in Maryland the claim that Balk owed Epstein
money.
Instead, the Court focused on the situs of the debt and held that
a debt can be garnished wherever the debtor can be found in the
sense of being subject to suit by his creditor. The intangible debt was
regarded as property subject to attachment. If plaintiff could
demonstrate that the defendant, who had no relationship with the
jurisdiction, was a creditor of the person served with the garnishment
and that defendant owed plaintiff money, then plaintiff could collect
from the garnishee. This was permissible even though the defendant
may have had no contact with the jurisdiction other than the pres-
ence of his creditor.
The Supreme Court never asked whether the procedure was fair
to Balk; it simply found that because his debtor, Harris, was present
within the jurisdiction of Maryland, a Maryland court could assert
jurisdiction over Balk. Harris v. Balk represents the height of the
power theory because it is based on presence alone; a court has the
power to adjudicate the rights to any particular piece of property,
even an intangible such as a debt, once it is within the state's terri-
tory.
Under the minimum contacts or fairness test of International
Shoe, presence is just one of the factors a court should consider to
determine whether it is fair to assert in personain jurisdiction over a
defendant. There is also the question of whether the defendant's par-
ticular contacts with the jurisdiction are related to the plaintiff's cause
9. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
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of action. 10 Another factor is the nexus between the state's gov-
ernmental interests in providing a forum for particular claims or in
regulating the actions of nonresidents and the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion."
The classical case in which the state's interest in providing a
forum overcame the defendant's lack of contact with the forum was
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 12 In McGee, the defend-
ant insurance company's contacts with the forum state, California,
consisted of one letter offering to reinsure a particular person who
resided in California. When the insured died, plaintiff brought suit in
California to collect under the policy. Although the insurance com-
pany had not solicited or done business in California, except for issu-
ing the insurance policy which was the subject matter of the litiga-
tion, the company's contacts were found to be sufficient. The Court
held that California had jurisdiction over the defendant because of the
relationship created by California's manifest interest in providing a
forum for an in-state plaintiff to collect insurance proceeds, when the
out-of-state insurer refuses to pay.13
The requisite relationship between the defendant and the forum
state necessary for in personarn jurisdiction was clarified further by
the Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla. 14 In this case, the
executor of an estate being probated in Florida petitioned the court
to exercise jurisdiction over the administrator of a Delaware trust.
The trust was first established by the decedent when she was living
in Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court held that the Florida court had
no jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee because the trust company
never made a "purposive act" to submit itself to Florida's juris-
diction.' 5 Although the decedent had exercised the power of
appointment under the trust in Florida, and although the benefi-
ciaries were located in Florida, the Delaware trustee had made no
purposive act toward Florida.
The Supreme Court was slowly eroding the power theory of
jurisdiction through this line of in personam cases, but "power" or
10. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
11. See McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 223. The State's manifest interest was in protecting its residents who
would be unable to afford the costs of litigating their claims out of state and in
providing a forum in which the witnesses would be residing.
14. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
15. Id. at 253.
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"territoriality" still remained the conceptual basis for in rein and
quasi in rein jurisdiction. Contradictions between the "fairness" test
for in personain jurisdiction and the "presence" test as a basis for
quasi in rein jurisdiction were apparent, but the Supreme Court
avoided dealing with the conflict until Shaffer.
B. Pre-Shaffer Jurisdiction in Florida
Prior to examining Shaffer, however, a brief reference to the
Florida jurisdictional statutes is appropriate. The long-arm statute
Florida enacted in 1973 16 incorporated the language of Florida's prior
"doing business" statute. 17 This led the Florida courts to follow the
state courts' earlier decisions under the "doing business" section in
determining the amount of business a foreign corporation, not
licensed to do business in Florida, must engage in before being sub-
ject to suit in Florida. Due process would permit Florida to extend
its "doing business" long-arm statute much further than Florida has
by statute. ' 8
By comparison, the wording in Florida's single act statute, which
is now included as part of Florida Statutes section 48.193, is ex-
tremely broad. The statute no longer requires that a nonresident de-
fendant derive substantial revenue from Florida in order to be subject
to suit in Florida for the commission of a wrongful act outside of the
state which has an impact within the state. 19 The statute provides
for jurisdiction over any defendant engaged in solicitation or service
activities within the state when these activities result in an injury to
persons or property within the state; the statute also provides for
jurisdiction when the defendant sells goods to be used or consumed
within the ordinary course of commerce when such use or consump-
tion results in an injury in the state. 20  This new language is much
16. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1977).
17. FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1969).
18. See Youngblood v. Citrus Assoc. of New York Cotton Exch., Inc., 276 So.2d
505 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
19. FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1977).
20. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(0 provides:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who
personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this
subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural person, his
personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any
cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following:
(f) Causes injury to persons or property within this state arising out of
an act or omission outside of this state by the defendant, provided that at
the time of the injury either:
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broader than the prior section concerned with acts committed outside
the state with an impact in Florida. 21 As a result, the series of cases
interpreting this section have been decided on constitutional, as well
as statutory grounds.
In the first case, Dunn v. Upjohn C0.,22 a nonresident pharma-
cist was sued by the administratrix of a Florida resident's estate. The
decedent had owned and operated a store in the pharmacist's state,
Georgia, and allegedly died in Florida as a result of taking a drug
prescribed by the defendant. Although the decedent consumed the
drug in Florida and the drug was the kind of good that could move in
interstate commerce, the court found no personal jurisdiction over
the nonresident pharmacist. The court said that to hold otherwise
would violate due process because there was no purposive act by the
pharmacist. Moreover, a contrary result would mean that the phar-
macist could be subject to suit throughout the nation if he had reason
to believe a client was a nonresident and if the client's home state
had a long-arm statute similar to that of Florida.2
3
There are also good economic reasons for not exercising personal
jurisdiction over the pharmacist in Dunn. The costs of requiring a
local pharmacist to defend in an action wherever a puchaser con-
sumes the drug and becomes ill would increase his costs of doing
business. In the case of the manufacturer of a drug who sells his
product on an interstate basis, these costs should be viewed as part of
the expense of doing business and be reflected in the price of the
drug. In a sense, all potential plaintiffs pay slightly more for the drug
for the privilege of being able to sue in their home jurisdiction if they
become ill. This makes sense if potential plaintiffs are widely scat-
tered throughout the country. In the case of the local pharmacist,
however, the situation is distinct. Most purchasers will be local, and it
would make little sense to force them to pay more for drugs so the
infrequent nonresident purchaser can sue in the purchaser's home
state. This type of analysis helps to clarify the underlying con-
siderations where a market transaction is involved and the costs of
1. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities
within this state which resulted in such injury; or
2. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufac-
tured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state
in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use, and the use or con-
sumption resulted in the injury.
21. FLA. STAT. § 48.081 (1967).
22. 350 So.2d 127 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
23. Id. at 129.
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potential litigation can be reflected in the price of a good. Most
courts rarely address such issues directly, but they are often implicit
in the court's reasoning.
The second example, Jack Picard Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough,24 is
also typical. In Dodge, a car was repaired in North Carolina and was
driven to Florida and resold there. A Florida resident was injured
due to an allegedly defective repair. When the Florida resident sued
the manufacturer and local Dodge dealer, the local dealer attempted
to implead the North Carolina company that made the repairs. The
court held that the North Carolina company simply repaired the car,
and that such acts did not mean the North Carolina dealer purpose-
fully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Florida. The
court felt that interpreting the Florida statute to hold the North
Carolina company within the personal jurisdiction of a Florida court
would violate due process. 25
The most surprising decision, however, is Harlo Products Corp.
v. J.I. Case Co. ,26 where suit was brought against a forklift manufac-
turer for injuries sustained because of a defect in one of the forklifts.
Although it was alleged that the manufacturer actually had a number
of forklifts being used in Florida, the court did not exercise jurisdic-
tion over the company because the company did not purposefully
avail itself of the privilege of doing business in Florida.2 7 In this
case, the type of economic analysis I applied to Dunn would seem to
favor jurisdiction.
All three of these cases, but particularly Harlo, illustrate the
conservative approach of the Florida courts in the interpretation of
Florida's long-arm statutes.
III. SHAFFER V. HEITNER
This brings us to the Supreme Court's opinion in Shaffer, and its
implications for the minimum contacts test and for the quasi in rein
approach to obtaining jurisdiction over nonresidents. The facts of
Shaffer are important to an understanding of the case since it is pos-
sible to interpret the holding in either a narrow or a broad sense,
depending upon the side one is arguing.
24. 352 So.2d 130 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
25. See id. at 132-33.
26. 360 So.2d 1328 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
27. Id. at 1330.
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Shaffer was a derivative action against a Delaware corporation's
directors and officers and its California subsidiary. The principal
headquarters of the Delaware corporation were in Arizona, and the
company had no contacts with Delaware, other than being incorpo-
rated there. The action was filed against the corporation's subsidiary
and twenty-eight directors and officers. It was not alleged that any of
the individual directors or officers had attended meetings in Delaware
or had conducted any corporate business in Delaware. The cause of
action grew out of antitrust violations which took place in Oregon
where the company had been sued for violations of the antitrust laws.
The subsequent derivative action was for breach of fiduciary duty by
the defendants who engaged in the antitrust violations.
The plaintiff had no way of obtaining in personam jurisdiction
over the individual defendants in Delaware because they had no con-
tacts with the state. Therefore, plaintiff served defendants in ac-
cordance with a Delaware statute which provides that the situs of the
ownership of stock in a Delaware corporation is the State of Dela-
ware. 28  The plaintiff sequestered and placed stop orders on approx-
imately 82,000 shares of stock owned by the various directors of the
Delaware corporation. 2 9 Plaintiff's cause of action, breach of
fiduciary duty toward the corporation, was unrelated to the ownership
of the stock making it a quasi in rem form of jurisdiction.
Although there was a relationship in this case between the cause
of action and the corporation, the statute could be read to allow a
plaintiff to attach the stock of a Delaware corporation owned by any
nonresident and to sue the nonresident in Delaware irrespective of
any relationship between the cause of action and the corporation. For
example, the suit might be based on a totally independent commer-
cial transaction. In addition, the statute required a defendant to make
a general appearance in order to litigate the case on the merits in the
Delaware court. 30 The directors appeared in court, and made mo-
tions to dismiss on two grounds. First, citing International Shoe, de-
fendants argued that they had no minimum contacts with Delaware
and that to require them to respond to this claim in Delaware vio-
lated their due process rights. Second, they claimed that the form in
which the stock had been sequestered or attached violated their pro-
cedural due process rights under the Sniadach 31 line of cases.
28. See 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 169 (1975).
29. See 10 DEL. CODE ANN. § 366 (1975).
30. DEL. CT. C.P.R. 12(b) (1975).
31. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See North Georgia
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Sniadach requires the procedural due process rights of notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to the seizure of one's property.
Where it is feared that the property may be removed from the juris-
diction, due process mandates both the filing of an affidavit to that
effect, which is reviewed by a judge, and an immediate post-seizure
hearing. 3 2 The Delaware procedures for sequestering stock arguably
violated this standard. 33  The real issue in Shaffer, at this point, was
whether the line of cases concerned with procedural due process in
the context of an attachment prior to a hearing to preserve the se-
curity of a subsequent judgment on the merits 34 would be applied to
a sequestration for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over a non-
resident. 3 5
This procedural due process issue was the major question ad-
dressed by the Delaware courts,3 6 and it was generally thought that
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide this issue in light of
the procedural due process cases. Instead, the Court started out by
stating that the real question was whether quasi in rem jurisdiction
still made sense for causes of action unrelated to the attached prop-
erty.
Justice Marshall, who wrote the opinion for the Court, began his
analysis by examining the principal justification for quasi in rem juris-
diction: fear that the defendant may attempt to avoid payment of an
obligation by removing his assets to a jurisdiction where he is not
subject to in personam jurisdiction. Marshall identified two responses
to this justification for quasi in rem jurisdiction. First, he reasoned
that the issue of jurisdiction is distinct from the problem of security
in the sense that property can be attached as security for a potential
judgment without the cause of action being litigated in the court
where the property is located. The court can decide to attach the
goods and to hold them pending the outcome of litigation without
also adjudicating the dispute between the parties.
This distinction is important for post-Shaffer cases if the defend-
ant has property in a particular jurisdiction where he lacks sufficient
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
32. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 616-18.
33. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
34. Id. at 91 n.23, citing Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
35. See Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 17 A.2d 365 (Del. 1955) (The object of
service is to compel general appearance).
36. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
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contacts to be sued. Shaffer suggests a plaintiff may be able to tie up
the property to secure a potential judgment before the defendant is
able to remove the property from the jurisdiction.
Marshall's second response to this justification for quasi in rem
jurisdiction was the full faith and credit clause. This constitutional
provision assures the validity of the judgment in any state where de-
fendant moves his property so there is no reason to compel a defend-
ant to litigate in an inconvenient forum simply because he owns
property located there.
Note that Marshall's second response is not applicable to a case
involving a foreign defendant; there is no full faith and credit clause
which can be used to compel a foreign jurisdiction to recognize a
judgment in the same sense. Of course, there may be a principle of
comity based on a treaty which provides that the foreign jurisdiction
will give effect to a judgment rendered in the United States.
Marshall's main point, however, was that since these concerns over
satisfying a judgment can be dealt with by looking at the issue of
security independent of jurisdiction in light of the facts of each par-
ticular case, we should apply the same fairness standards that we use
in normal in personam jurisdiction to quasi in rem actions. Thus, in
the Type B quasi in rem action, where the attached property is unre-
lated to the underlying cause of action, the question should be
whether it is fair to compel a defendant to submit to a court's juris-
diction given his contacts with the forum. In fact, Marshall seemed to
say that the minimum contacts analysis should be applied to all causes
of action, including true in rem. 37
In the case of any true in rem action, the minimum contacts test
will be satisfied easily anyway. Ownership of property that is pres-
ently in the jurisdiction, particularly real property, would normally
constitute a minimum contact sufficient to adjudicate rights related to
the property. It is reasonable for people to expect a court to adjudi-
cate rights to real property located within the court's jurisdiction. The
more serious problem will be those few cases where Marshall's
reasoning is inappropriate, but the breadth of the opinion suggests
quasi in rem jurisdiction will not be valid.
After the Court's rather sweeping conclusion that the minimum
contacts analysis applies to all assertions of state court jurisdiction, it
anticlimactically stated in a footnote that insofar as Pennoyer and
37. 433 U.S. at 212.
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Harris v. Balk were inconsistent with this view, they were over-
ruled.38 The end of one hundred years of the power theory of juris-
diction was relegated to a footnote.
After the general discussion of the law of jurisdiction, the Court
faced the problem of applying the minimum contacts analysis to the
particular case at hand. Marshall used the Hanson v. Denckla pur-
posive act test and found that there was no purposive act by the,
directors of the Delaware corporation to submit themselves to the
general jurisdiction of Delaware. 39  As a basis for minimum contacts,
plaintiff pointed to the following: (a) defendants had accepted a direc-
torship in the corporation; (b) the state had the power to regulate the
corporation and to hold its directors to their fiduciary duties; and (c)
the directors gained benefits in terms of the particular types of loans
they could obtain from the corporation, as well as other advantages
under Delaware law for directors of Delaware corporations. Neverthe-
less, Marshall found no purposive act. He acknowledged that Dela-
ware could probably enact a specific statute for the purpose of obtain-
ing jurisdiction over the director of a Delaware corporation for causes
of action growing out of his actions as a director, but it would have to
be a specific statute expressing the state's interest in such causes of
action. 40
The opinion seems to suggest that if a state has a strong policy
reason for exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident with few or no
contacts, the state should enact a specific statute expressing the
state's interest in providing a forum for particular types of claims. 4 '
The statute must express a state interest which overcomes the lack of
a defendant-forum nexus. In other words, specific legislation is
needed to demonstrate the nexus among the government's interest,
the particular forum, and plaintiff's cause of action. It may no longer
be enough to merely have a broad statute providing for jurisdiction to
the limits permitted by the due process clause.4 2
In a dissenting opinion, Brennan questioned Marshall's analysis
of the minimum contacts issue. Although he agreed with the majority
38. Id. at 212 n.39.
39. Id. at 216.
40. Id. Some states have enacted statutes which treat the acceptance of a direc-
torship as consent to State court jurisdiction. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§ 33-322 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-33 (1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-5-70 (1977).
41. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (1977).
42. California's statute lacks this specificity. See WEST'S ANN. C.C.P. § 410.10
(1973) which provides that, "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any
basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."
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that quasi in rem jurisdiction should be overruled, he found a suffi-
cient nexus between the nonresident board of directors and the forum
state to sustain in personam jurisdiction.43 To add to the confusion,
two other justices wrote opinions. Powell was hesitant to formulate
such a sweeping holding because of the difficulty of anticipating the
kinds of cases which may arise. In addition, he explicitly reserved
judgment on the question of whether quasi in rem jurisdiction should
still be allowed for the attachment of real property as the basis for
adjudicating an unrelated cause of action. 44 In a similar opinion,
Stevens stated that he recognized the difficulty of anticipating the full
implications of the decision, and would, therefore, narrow the deci-
sion to the facts of the particular case. 45
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SHAFFER V. HEITNEi
First, transitory presence as the basis for jurisdiction is probably
gone. As you know from the theory of power over territory, it was
assumed a court could obtain jurisdiction over a defendant physically
present within the court's territory. Even if the defendant was only
there long enough to be served, the court had in personam jurisdic-
tion. When the minimum contacts test is applied independently of
the power theory, simply traveling through a state will not necessarily
constitute a sufficient minimum contact. The central question will be
whether it is fair to force the defendant to submit to the court's juris-
diction given the extent of his contacts and the state's interest in pro-
viding plaintiff with a forum. His presence will be one factor within
the broader fairness test.
Second, there is the problem of how to secure a judgment when
defendant has property, particularly a debt, in a jurisdiction where he
lacks minimum contacts and the property may be removed prior to
judgment if it is not attached. For example, assume your client has
entered into a contract with a European firm calling for performance
in Europe. If there is a breach, your client may wish to avoid suing
in the European jurisdiction. In looking for a United States forum,
you find a California company owes the European defendant a debt
on an unrelated transaction. With quasi in rein jurisdiction, you could
go to California, attach the debt, and sue defendant on your contract
in a California court. What do you do now?
43. 433 U.S. at 219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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A. The Post-Shaffer Decisions
California Power & Light Co. v. Uranex 4 6 is a good example of
the problems a plaintiff faces in this situation. A North Carolina pub-
lic utility ordered uranium concentrates from Uranex, a French com-
pany engaged in marketing uranium internationally. When the price
of uranium increased markedly in the world market, Uranex wanted
to renegotiate the contract and the North Carolina utility was afraid
that even an arbitration award would be difficult to enforce unless the
utility could attach assets of Uranex in the United States. Before ar-
bitration was initiated, the utility attached an unrelated, eighty-five
million dollar debt that a California company owed Uranex. This
presented a relatively straightforward case of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion, but then Shaffer was decided, and suddenly defendant had a
basis for challenging the jurisdiction of the California court. The debt
bore no relationship to the utility's claim against Uranex for breach of
contract.
The court in Uranex relied on Marshall's distinction between the
problems of securing a judgment and obtaining jurisdiction and held
that although there was no jurisdiction over the European company,
the debt was present in California. The court decided to attach the
debt pending the parties' adjudication of their dispute in a forum
where plaintiff could obtain in personam jurisdiction.4 7
California had no jurisdiction over the defendant, but the court
was willing to give plaintiff thirty days to initiate an action in a state
where in personam jurisdiction could be satisfied. This meant that
plaintiff had to file an action in a New York court, which would sub-
sequently be stayed pending arbitration, because the California at-
tachment could not be sustained simply on the initiation of informal
arbitration proceedings in New York. 48  However, the California
court would hold the assets pending the outcome of litigation, which
in this case meant that the New York court would stay its proceedings
pending arbitration and then issue an order enforcing the arbitrator's
award if needed.
Omni Aircraft,4 9 another recent decision, was decided to the
contrary. Omni contracted to buy Lear jets from a Spanish company.
46. 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
47. Id. at 1049.
48. Id.
49. Omni Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Actividades Aereas Aragones, No. 77-669 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 15, 1977).
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The agreement was entered into in France and Spain and was to be
performed in Switzerland. Problems arose, and it appeared that Omni
Aircraft would have to sue the Spanish company. The difficulty for
Omni was whether it could attach property of the Spanish company
in the United States and obtain jurisdiction. As it turned out, the
Spanish company had a Lear jet engine in Arizona being repaired, so
Omni tried to attach the jet engine.
Omni argued that the federal district court in Arizona had juris-
diction to adjudicate the parties' rights under the contract to purchase
Lear jets because the defendant had committed a purposive act by
sending the jet engine to Arizona. The court disagreed with Omni's
contention. Relying on Shaffer, the court held that the contract was
unrelated to the jet engine in Arizona, and that defendant had no
minimum contacts with the forum state. Had the dispute been re-
lated to the jet engine, the court would have exercised jurisdiction,
but here defendant's purposive act and the property were unrelated
to plaintiff's claim. The court distinguished Uranex by saying that the
eighty-five million dollar debt in California had a greater nexus with
California than the nexus created by the mere sending of a jet engine
for repairs to Arizona.
It is very difficult to decide what the real distinction is between
the two cases because the court in Oinni does not deal extensively
with the Uranex decision. The Omni case is also an unpublished opin-
ion so it may not have much impact. 50
A third recent case interpreting Shaffer is Feder v. Turkish
Airlines.5 1 A wrongful death action was filed in New York as a result
of a plane crash near Istanbul. The plaintiff initially tried to establish
in personam jurisdiction based upon the foreign company's "doing
business" within the criteria set out by the New York statute. 52 The
plaintiffs were unable to sustain this jurisdictional allegation, but in
the process of investigating the company's business contacts in New
York, the plaintiff found that the defendant had a one hundred
thousand dollar account in the Chase Manhattan Bank. The plaintiffs
attached the bank account as a basis for jurisdiction.
Following Shaffer, the court found that the cause of action was
unrelated to the bank account which was used to pay for airplane
50. The plaintiff was able to either reach a settlement or renegotiate its contract
with the defendant, so that there was no adjudication on the merits.
51. 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
52. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & R. § 301 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1979).
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parts purchased in the United States. However, the court did not
limit its application of the minimum contacts test to the defendant's
acts related to the cause of action. Instead, the court applied a
minimum contacts analysis to the bank account, and found that it was
a purposive act by the defendant to place money in a bank account in
New York. Therefore, the court concluded, it was not unfair to hold
the defendant to litigation in New York, at least up to the value of
the bank account. 53
The Feder analysis may not be consistent with Shaffer, but it
reflects another line of New York cases that grew out of quasi in rem
jurisdiction, beginning with Seider v. Roth.54 Under Seider, a New
York plaintiff may attach a debt of an insurance company to an in-
sured even though the insured has no relationship with the State of
New York. In other words, assume there is an accident in Vermont
involving "A," a New York resident, and "B," who has never set foot
in New York. "B" is insured by a company with a main office in New
York, so "A" attaches the contingent debt owed by the insurance
company to "B." The debt is contingent on the court finding that "B"
negligently caused the accident. Of course the insurance company ac-
tually defends so the result is a judicially-created direct action statute.
The Seider cases have been justified under a minimum contacts
test by looking at the contacts of the insurance company with the
particular jurisdiction rather than the defendant's contacts. 5 Al-
though there is an obvious distinction between the Feder bank ac-
count and an insurance company doing business within a state, the
analysis in Feder reflects a similar approach to the question of
minimum contacts. New York appears to be willing to apply the
minimum contacts analysis to the nexus between defendant and the
property even if the cause of action is not related to the property and
defendant has no other contacts with the state.
This suggests that for a time we may see a number of standards
growing out of Shaffer. First, there may be distinct standards for the
minimum contacts test when the court is dealing with a foreign com-
pany and the full faith and credit clause does not provide a basis for
enforcing the judgment. In other words, if the defendant in Feder
53. 441 F. Supp. at 1278-79.
54. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.YS.2d 99 (1966).
55. See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp, 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978);
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). See also Savchuk v. Rush, 47 L.W.
2290 (Minn. Sup. Ct., Oct. 10, 1978).
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was from Oregon, the analysis might have been different than in the
case of a foreign defendant who may become judgment-proof by re-
moving his property from the United States. When a Turkish com-
pany is involved and the assets could be quickly moved from New
York to Turkey, the plaintiff does not know what will happen when
he attempts to enforce the New York judgment in Turkey. The
Turkish courts may approach the enforcement of judgments differ-
ently. Thus, a plaintiff must be prepared to argue the particular facts
of his case in light of the doctrine commonly referred to as "jurisdic-
tion by necessity."
The doctrine of "jurisdiction by necessity" applies where the
plaintiff lacks an effective alternative forum. There are a number of
cases which indicate that the courts will be more inclined to find
jurisdiction on the basis of limited contacts if plaintiff has no meaning-
ful alternative forum. 56 In the case of a foreign corporation, it can be
argued that many foreign forums are, at a practical level, not real
alternatives. Although a court will not want to say this overtly, plain-
tiff can still try to persuade the court by relying on cases such as
Feder.
Another New York case which is of particular interest for people
in Florida is Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc. 57 The de-
fendant, an Ohio corporation, actually had considerable contacts with
businesses in New York through the sales of meat to grocery stores,
but these contacts did not satisfy New York's "doing business" stat-
ute. 58 As an alternative, plaintiff attached a debt owed to defendants
by a New York purchaser. Plaintiff argued that although the attach-
ment was under a quasi in rem statute, it did not render jurisdiction
unconstitutional if there were adequate minimum contacts to satisfy
due process. Thus, the issue became whether defendant's due process
rights were violated by requiring the company to answer a cause of
action where jurisdiction was obtained by attaching a debt which was
unrelated to the underlying claim. The court agreed with the plaintiff
and held that it was fair to require the Ohio defendant to come to
New York and litigate, because the defendant was engaged in regular
56. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306(1950).
57. 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978).
58. See N.Y. Civ. Ps, c. LAW & R. § 301 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1979). This
is similar to the situation in Florida where there were several contacts within the
state but not enough to fall within the interpretation of what is necessary for pur-
poses of doing business.
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commerce with New York purchasers and because the defendant
agreed in the sales contracts to arbitrate disputes in New York even
though the company could not be served under the "doing business"
long-arm statute. 59
The Intermeat decision presents an interesting option. It
suggests that a quasi in rein statute can be used as a long-arm statute
by attaching a particular debt or other property. This will only be a
viable option when a state's long-arm statute does not reach the de-
fendant because of the limited statutory language, but where "due
process" would not be violated if the statutory authorization to serve
process existed. In this case, the attachment of property and service
of process under the quasi in rein statute provides the necessary
legislative authorization.
B. Admiralty and Family Law
Two other areas in which Shaffer is fostering confusion are admi-
ralty and family law. In the case of admiralty, Supplemental Rule B(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant's
vessel or other property can be attached to bring an unrelated cause
of action if the defendant cannot be found within the district. 60
Grand Bahama Petrol, Co., Ltd. v. Canadian Transportation
Agencies, Ltd. ,61 was the first important admiralty case dealing with
this rule after Shaffer. A Soviet flag vessel, chartered by a Canadian
group, purchased fuel from the Grand Bahama Petroleum Company.
When the Canadian group failed to pay the full purchase price, the
plaintiff attached defendant's bank account in Seattle. The defendant's
only contact with the State of Washington was the bank account, so in
essence it was a quasi in rein form of jurisdiction. The claim was
unrelated to the attached property and there were insufficient con-
tacts to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.
The court dealt with the problem by concluding that Shaffer did
not govern this situation since admiralty was a unique field of law
with its own historical traditions and a distinct set of commercial
59. 575 F.2d at 1023.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. B(1) provides in relevant part:
With respect to any admiralty or maritime claim in personam a verified
complaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant's goods
and chattels, or credits and effects in the hands of garnishees named in the
complaint to the amount sued for, if the defendant shall not be found
within the district.
61. 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
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relationships.6 2  To support this view, the court pointed to the au-
tonomous nature of admirality law and the existence of a quasi in rem
theory of jurisdiction in admiralty prior to the United States Constitu-
tion.
In a subsequent admiralty case, another federal district court
treated the issue similarly. 63 The judge cited the Grand Bahama
case and concluded that power and territoriality should be retained as
the cornerstone of jurisdiction in admiralty. 64  It is questionable
whether this trend can continue in the face of Shaffer, but the courts
are approaching the problem from the concept of an autonomous
body of admiralty law. Of course even if the Shaffer mode of analysis
is applied, a court might uphold jurisdiction based upon the attach-
ment of property unrelated to the cause of action by concluding this
procedure is "fair" in the case of admiralty. If there is an established
tradition that this type of procedure is necessary and expected in the
context of commercial transactions related to shipping, then it may
not be "unfair."
Shaffer is also causing complications in the field of family law.
Assume a wife lives with her child in Nebraska and that her husband
moves to Indiana. The wife has no contacts with Indiana, but the
husband, who is residing there, brings divorce proceedings in
Indiana. The wife responds that she has no minimum contacts with
Indiana and that it is unfair to adjudicate the divorce in Indiana.
The traditional judicial response to such facts is that the res of
the marriage is where either spouse is located and that the Indiana
court can dissolve the marriage. 65 Questions such as alimony, child
custody, and child support are in personam decrees which may re-
quire minimum contacts, but historically a dissolution of the marriage
only required the presence of one spouse. If minimum contacts are to
be applied to all in rem forms of jurisdiction, can the marriage still be
dissolved? Courts have responded that it can, because this is the es-
tablished tradition in family law.66
Carr v. Carr,6 7 is a recent family law case which illustrates the
problems with this view given Shaffer. There were two women who
62. See id. at 453-56.
63. See Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Naviga-
tion, 459 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
64. 459 F. Supp. at 1249.
65. See In re Marriage of Rinderknecht, 367 N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
66. 367 N.E.2d at 1134.
67. 60 App.Div.2d 63, 400 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1977).
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claimed to be the wife of the deceased, one in New York and one in
California. Both women wanted his federal pension. The one in New
York had been divorced by the deceased in Honduras. She chal-
lenged the validity of the divorce and asked a New York court to
declare her as the lawful surviving spouse of the decedent. The wife
in California, who had married the decedent subsequent to his di-
vorce from the first wife, had no contacts with New York and sought
to dismiss the action. The court denied the motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that if the husband were alive, the
New York courts could dissolve the marriage res in New York and
that there was no reason that New York should lose its power to
determine a domiciliary's marriage status simply because her spouse
was now deceased. 68 The court simply ignored the impact of its de-
cree on the rights of a nonresident who had no contacts with New
York. Given Shaffer, the court's analysis must be questioned.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Kulko v. Superior Court,6 9 also
supports the view that traditional concepts of jurisdiction in the field
of family law may be changing. In Kulko, the husband was in New
York and had custody of the children under an agreement executed in
New York. One of the children decided that she wanted to live with
her mother who had remarried and was living in California. The hus-
band voluntarily sent the child to California, and, subsequently, the
wife wanted additional child support. The mother brought suit in
California to increase the child support payments. She argued that
California could exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant
because he voluntarily sent the child to California and the child was
living in California and receiving the benefits of California law. If
something happened to the child, California, under its laws, would be
responsible for the child's welfare. The California Supreme Court up-
held jurisdiction 70 and the United States Supreme Court reversed. 71
It can be argued that the Supreme Court reversed because the
plaintiff had an alternative; she could have brought her action in
California under the Uniform Child Support Act.72 This statute pro-
vides for the automatic transfer and subsequent adjudication of her
case in New York without her retaining a New York attorney or going
to New York. The procedure, however, would raise the problem of
68. 60 App. Div. 2d at 66, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
69. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
70. 19 Cal. 3d 514, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586, 564 P.2d 353 (1977) (en banc).
71. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
72. See WEST'S ANN. C.C.P. § 1650 (1973).
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whether New York or California law would apply. A California court
adjudicating the case would have applied California law, but under
the Uniform Act's procedure, a New York court would be free to
apply New York law. 73 In this sense, the Uniform Act is not totally
responsive to plaintiff's needs or to California's interest in protecting
the welfare of a child located in California. The case is also important
for the Court's views on the defendant-forum nexus, in the sense of a
purposive act which was necessary to exercise in personam jurisdic-
tion. The policy reasons for requiring substantial contacts in family
law cases are strong. Without the minimum contacts requirement,
fathers may be deterred from acquiescing to a child's decision to live
with a parent in another state for fear of being sued for child support
in that state. The court did not want the parent who was giving up
the child to worry about defending a child custody suit or support
action in an inconvenient forum.
V. CONCLUSION
The cases we have discussed today involve a wide variety of legal
fields including family law, admiralty, corporate law, and jurisdiction
over foreign defendants in commercial situations. These cases suggest
that the courts may begin developing concepts of jurisdiction which
are peculiar to each area of the law. With the demise of the power or
territoriality theory, the minimum contacts framework will be more
tied to the particular facts of each case and to a concept of what is
fair, given the parties' expectations and the substantive policies un-
derlying the field of law being litigated. Jurisdiction may lose some of
its internal consistency as a body of law, but in the end, it may come
closer to being fair to the parties and to reinforcing the policies em-
bodied in substantive legal rules.
73. 436 U.S. at 99.
